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Abstract Manufacturers and producers of smart card systems are all beginning
to climb on the certification bandwagon. In this paper, we analyse
the current state of smart card certifications and present arguments
as to why smart card certifications may not be all they seem. We
discuss certifications issued under the ITSEC and Common Criteria
and analyse shortcomings and inconsistencies that appear to exist in the
certifications. Specific examples are presented to justify our arguments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A number of smart card products have received security certification
through the ITSEC and Common Criteria schemes in recent years. Suc-
cessful evaluation, particularly to high assurance levels can be of great
benefit in marketing these products since security concerns figure promi-
nently in the realm of smart cards and the certification process is all
about establishing confidence in security. The goal of this paper is to
examine the applicability and value of smart card certifications from the
perspective of card issuers. The paper presents a survey and analysis of
certifications issued for smart cards in the finance and banking industry.
This sector has an increasing need for confidence in smart card security
because they are developing applications that leverage the card’s fa-
cilities of tamper resistance, secure storage and onboard cryptographic
processing to the full.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents an overview
of the certification process under ITSEC and the Common Criteria. It
highlights some of the challenges in applying the criteria to smart cards,
challenges that flow from the nature of the device, the fact that they
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2are issued in large numbers to untrusted users for their long term reten-
tion, and the orientation of the evaluation criteria toward software and
components for networked computer systems. Section three presents a
thorough survey of smart card certifications issued for banking applica-
tions since December 1997. Although the focus of the survey is on a
particular sector, this does not limit the more general relevance of the
analysis. The issues raised are equally applicable to any card issuer who
distributes smart cards to untrusted users. The survey analysis high-
lights the relationship between the scope of the evaluation and the level
of security accreditation achieved. The discussion proceeds on the basis
that certifications will be of the greatest benefit to issuers when they are
sufficiently comprehensive to allow an assessment of whether a candidate
card is secure enough for an intended application, the risks associated
with its use being known and acceptable.
Under the ITSEC and Common Criteria schemes, the approach and
requirements for the evaluation of individual information technology
products is different to that of complete systems. Because this paper
deals with smart cards which are evaluated as products, the following
discussion deals only with the schemes as they apply to products.
2. HOW CERTIFICATION WORKS
2.1. ITSEC
The ITSEC scheme [3] evaluates the product or Target of Evaluation
(TOE) against a security target. The security target is a document pre-
pared by the evaluation sponsor. In general terms, the security target
describes what the product does, the environment it is intended to op-
erate in, the threats it is likely to encounter and how it protects against
those threats. The security target makes claims about the security func-
tionality of the TOE and the evaluation process determines whether
these claims are substantiated. In this sense, the security target forms
the basis of the evaluation and a certification must be interpreted within
the scope of the security target’s claims.
ITSEC uses an E scale with seven levels from E0 to E6. These evalu-
ation levels represent increasing levels of confidence that the TOE meets
its security target, where E0 denotes failure to establish any confidence
and E6 denotes the highest level of confidence. The E scale is a mea-
sure of assurance that a target has been met, not a measure of security
strength. Because the security target effectively defines the scope of the
evaluation, it is potentially dangerous to automatically equate a high
assurance rating with high levels security functionality in a particular
operational environment. As the later analysis of actual smart card cer-
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tifications will illustrate, security targets can tightly define and confine
the scope of what is actually evaluated. As examples, [1] and [2] exclude
the integrated circuit, [14] and [15] limit the scope of the evaluation to
the phases of design, manufacture and testing. As a consequence, it
can be difficult to draw definite conclusions about the ability of a card
to counter threats when they have been issued and are in the hands of
untrusted card holders, particularly where the evaluation did not thor-
oughly examine threats in this phase of the card lifecycle. This can limit
the utility that a potential issuer of a smart card can draw from a cer-
tification because issuers are primarily interested in how the card will
fare in actual use.
To establish assurance that a TOE meets its security target, the IT-
SEC scheme separates the concepts of confidence in the correctness of
implemented security functionality, and confidence in the effectiveness
of that functionality. This approach recognises that a set of correctly
implemented security mechanisms will not be effective unless they are
actually suitable for the task. They must bind together so that there
is a synergy in their individual contributions to security that leaves no
exploitable vulnerabilities. To enable evaluation on the basis of effec-
tiveness and correctness, a security target should express claims about a
TOE’s security properties at three different levels of abstraction - essen-
tially why, what and how. Security objectives are the highest level, the
why. They explain why particular functionality is necessary. Security
objectives reflect the threats that have been identified in the security
target. Security enforcing functions are the what. They detail what se-
curity functionality is actually provided. Security mechanisms are how
that security functionality is provided.
In addition to specifying a target assurance level, (E1 to E6) the se-
curity target must also claim a minimum strength of mechanisms (SoM)
rating. ITSEC [3] defines strength of mechanisms as:
“6.66 Strength of Mechanisms: an aspect of the assessment of the ef-
fectiveness of a Target of Evaluation, namely the ability of its security
mechanisms to withstand direct attack against deficiencies in their un-
derlying algorithms, principles and properties.”
There are three possible strength of mechanism ratings, namely basic,
medium and high. As the ITSEC definition suggests, the evaluator must
determine whether individual, critical security mechanisms can resist a
direct attack at the claimed minimum SoM level. This aspect of SoM,
(examining the strength of individual mechanisms against direct attack)
is very similar to the concept of strength of function1 under the Com-
1Strength of function analysis or AVA SOF is an assurance family in the Vulnerability As-
sessment class
4mon Criteria [17]. But there is another critical aspect to the strength
of mechanisms rating that is concerned with overall effectiveness of the
security functions. This second facet of SoM is largely equivalent to the
concept of attack potential 2 in the vulnerability assessment class under
the Common Criteria. The evaluator must investigate whether critical
mechanisms can be bypassed or avoided via an indirect attack. The
existence of indirect attack methods results in an exploitable vulnerabil-
ity. This second aspect of the minimum SoM claim and its relationship
to effectiveness analysis is explained in the ITSEC Joint Interpretation
Library [4]:
“6.4.2 The minimum strength of mechanisms claim also provides a scale
which shall be used to determine whether or not vulnerabilities in the
TOE generally are exploitable in practice. This means, as a minimum,
the examination of known and potential vulnerabilities is to be per-
formed according to the level of expertise, opportunity and resources
corresponding to the claimed minimum strength of mechanisms. Deter-
mination of whether or not a vulnerability is exploitable in the TOE’s
environment involve consideration of the levels of expertise, opportunity
and resources required for its exploitation.”
In this sense, the claimed minimum SoM is a measure of the attack
potential that the TOE can resist. A TOE with a high SoM should resist
attackers possessing a high level of expertise, opportunity and resources,
within the scope of the claims made by the security target. The issue of
scope is important because the security target can be very specific but
the concept of exploitable vulnerabilities is, of its nature, quite general.
Vulnerabilities that are exploitable in practice can be excluded from
consideration through restrictions on the scope of the security target.
The wording of security target claims becomes very important.
ITSEC is intended to provide evaluation criteria capable of producing
results that are objective and reproducible. But determining what a
high SoM means in the context of tamper resistant hardware is difficult
to do in a purely objective manner. These difficulties are foreshadowed
by ITSEC [3] where it states:
“1.3 These criteria are not intended to cover physical aspects of hard-
ware security such as the provision of tamper resistant enclosures or the
control of electromagnetic emanations.”
This is problematic for smart cards because their degree of tamper
resistance is a critical aspect of their utility. The Smart Card Security
2The three levels of attack potential map to the various components of the Vulnerability Anal-
ysis, (AVA VLA) assurance family. AVA VLA.4 requires resistance to attackers possessing a
high attack potential. AVA VLA.3 requires resistance to attackers possessing a moderate at-
tack potential. AVA VLA.2 requires resistance to attackers possessing a low attack potential.
AVA VLA.1 merely requires resistance to obvious attacks.
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User Group Smart Card Protection Profile [16] reinforces the impor-
tance of assessing tamper resistance saying “Physical attacks utilizing
techniques derived from semiconductor engineering must be evaluated
or the evaluation effort is inadequate.”3
There are also difficulties in interpreting the factors of expertise, op-
portunity and resources in the context of smart cards. (These factors
must be considered by the evaluator in the context of deciding whether
a vulnerability is exploitable in practice and therefore whether the min-
imum SoM claim is justified). The concept of resources includes equip-
ment and time, where “time is the time taken by an attacker to perform
the attack, not including study time” [7]. Smart cards for financial and
banking applications are issued in significant quantities to untrusted
users for their long term retention. It should therefore be expected that
an attacker could obtain multiple copies of a card without great diffi-
culty. This allows them to experiment without time constraints, not
caring if a number of cards are destroyed in the process.
Kuhn [8] states that a common attack methodology involves relatively
expensive and time consuming reverse engineering aimed at analysing
the security structure and design of the card, (including access control
mechanisms, hardware security mechanisms, data protection systems
and memory partitioning). Once this is understood, a simpler non-
invasive attack, (typically involving manipulation of the power or clock
signal) can often be designed. Such an attack can often be executed
on cards of the same type in seconds [8]. At issue is whether the first
stage of the process should be regarded as study time. If it is, a card
compromised in this way would be rated basic. If it isn’t, the reverse
engineering effort may justify a claim of a high minimum SoM.
This problem of interpretation can be traced to the realisation that
ITSEC was primarily envisaged as a scheme to evaluate networked com-
puter systems or components of those systems.4 The TOEs would typi-
cally be expensive parts of a connected, managed, interactive system so
an attacker would not have inexpensive access to multiple copies with
which to experiment. The aspect of time is more important in these
systems because longer attack times increase the likelihood of detection.
The likelihood of detection is also a factor in assessing opportunity since
attacks taking a longer period of time require greater levels of oppor-
3Annex B, Section B.1.8, page B-3 of [16]. The Smart Card Security User Group members
include American Express, Europay, JCB Co Ltd, Mastercard, Mondex, Visa, NIST and
NSA. The Protection Profile has been prepared under the Common Criteria scheme. The
document describes the security requirements for smart cards issued for sensitive applications,
particularly in the areas of banking and payment systems.
4This is also true of the Common Criteria.
6tunity to avoid discovery. Collusion with insiders may be necessary to
execute lengthy attacks. But with smart cards, detection risk does not
necessarily increase with time because an attacker can work in private.
So high levels of opportunity are not needed for attacks that require
a lengthy execution. Time merely adds to the cost and even substan-
tial costs may be justified by the potential rewards of compromising an
electronic purse or debit card scheme.
Under ITSEC, the required standards of effectiveness to justify a
high SoM are exacting, “. . . successful attack being judged to be beyond
normal practicality” [3]. Many of the cards in the survey (including
[1],[2],[10],[14] and [15]) have been certified with a high SoM but con-
cluding that an attack on these cards in their operational environment
is beyond normal practicality may be dangerous. It should be assumed
that, “given sufficient time and expertise, any smart card can be compro-
mised”.5 So with financial smart card applications, attack practicality
is influenced by matters of economics, measuring attack cost against po-
tential reward. This requires a thorough risk analysis of the complete
system. ITSEC can be used to evaluate complete systems but the scope
of inquiry can be contained to a greater degree when the TOE is eval-
uated as a product thereby enabling certification to a higher level of
assurance and SoM. These higher level certifications are useful to quote
in marketing material and press releases where the constraints or lim-
ited scope of the security target are not given emphasis. Readers of this
material should take great care that they are not inadvertently misled.
2.2. THE COMMON CRITERIA
The Common Criteria resulted from a cooperative effort to harmonise
the disparate frameworks for information technology security evaluation
that existed, particularly in Europe and North America. The general
concepts and approach have much in common with ITSEC including
evaluation against a security target to a defined level of assurance, con-
sidering aspects of correctness and effectiveness. The Common Criteria
envisages the definition of Protection Profiles (PP), standardised and
well understood sets of security requirements developed by a user group
to specify their security functionality needs for a particular product. [16]
is an example. This allows a manufacturer or product developer to build
a product according to the requirements of a PP. They can then have
it evaluated and claim conformance to the PP. The product is still eval-
5Section 2.6, page 7 of Smart Card Security User Group – Smart Card Protection Profile
[16].
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uated against a security target but the contents of the security target
mirror the requirements laid down in the protection profile.
The degree of assurance that a security target has been met is mea-
sured by the EAL scale, with possible ratings from EAL1 to EAL7. As
with ITSEC, the scope, depth and rigour of the evaluation increases
with EAL level. Each EAL has a predefined package of assurance com-
ponents drawn from the various assurance classes. Some examples of
assurance classes include vulnerability assessment (AVA), development
(ADV), tests (ATE), and delivery and operation (ADO). To illustrate the
relationship between EALs and assurance components, EAL1 does not
include any components from the vulnerability assessment class whereas
EAL3 includes AVA VLA.1 - Vulnerability Assessment, AVA SOF.1 -
Strength of Function Analysis and AVA MSU.1 - Misuse Analysis. A
number of the certifications in the survey augment the assurance com-
ponents of the selected EAL. This involves selecting a component that
would normally only be required in a higher EAL. Table entries 3 and 5
are augmented by the selection of AVA VLA.2, (independent vulnerabil-
ity assessment, resists low attack potential) which is normally required
by EAL4.
The Common Criteria assurance classes represent a refinement to the
ITSEC methodology in terms of explicitness and modularity. The Com-
mon Criteria includes a catalogue of well defined and understood security
functionality requirements [18]. These are known as functionality classes
and security targets or protection profiles specify their required security
functionality by drawing from this detailed catalogue. The advantage
of this approach is that the security functionality will be expressed in
an explicit, unambiguous way. The wording is well understood and [18]
includes detailed guidance for interpretation and application. This ex-
plicitness means that the precise scope of a security target, (and there-
fore, a certification) can be established. The framework of functionality
classes, families and components also enforces an internal consistency
on the functionality claims and a relationship to the identified threats.
Because security targets and protection profiles are constructed from a
set of standardised components, comparison of certifications by users
and mutual recognition by certification bodies is more practical.
The Common Criteria provides guidance on calculating attack poten-
tial that specifically factors in attack identification time, which is similar
to study time under the ITSEC. So under the Common Criteria, attack
identification time must be included. The detailed guidance on calculat-
ing attack potential aims at removing some of the subjectivity from this
difficult assessment task and it may offer more clarity that the ITSEC.
83. A SURVEY OF SMART CARD
CERTIFICATIONS
This section presents a survey of certifications issued for smart cards
intended for use in banking and electronic purse applications. The scope
of the security target and the definition of the TOE varies widely among
the surveyed products. We present observations regarding the relation-
ship between security target scope, TOE definition and the level of se-
curity accreditation achieved.
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1 MULTOS Version 3
on Hitachi H8/3112
[2]
National
Westminster
Bank Plc
Mondex
International
ITSEC UK P130 Sept
1999
E6 High Yes
2 Mondex Purse release
2.0 on MULTOS
Version 3 on Hitachi
H8/3112 [1]
National
Westminster
Bank Plc
Mondex
International
ITSEC UK P129 Sept
1999
E6 High Yes
3 Mondex Purse
Version 2.03 on
MULTOS V4.1N &
SLE66CX160S [9]
Credit
Mutuel
Mondex
International,
Keycorp,
Infineon
CC FRA 99/09 Nov
1999
EAL1
Aug-
mented
AVA VLA.2
Low No
4 SLE66CX160S
Chipcard Security
Controller [10]
Infineon
Technologies
Infineon
Technologies
ITSEC GER TUVIT-
DSZ-
ITSEC-
9102-1999
Mar 1999
E4 High Yes
5 Javacard/VOP
GemXpresso
211 on Philips
P8WE5032/MPH02
with applets
Oberthur B0 v0.32 &
Visa VSDC v1.08 [11]
Groupement
Carte Blue
Philips
Semiconductors,
Gemplus,
Oberthur,
Visa Interna-
tional
CC FRA 99/07 Dec
1999
EAL1
Aug-
mented
AVA VLA.2
Low No
6 Philips Smart
card Controller
P8WE5032V0B [12]
Philips
Semi-
conductors
Philips
Semi-
conductors
CC GER BSI-DSZ-
CC-0153-
1999 Nov
1999
EAL3 - Yes
7 Banking Applica-
tion B4/B0’ Com-
bined Smart Card
MONEO/CB on
ST19SF16B RCL [13]
Socie´te´
Europe´enne
de Monnaie
E´lectronique
IBM
Germany,
ST Micro-
electronics
CC FRA 99/04
Sept 1999
EAL1 - No
8 ST16SF44 A Masked
for application
SCOT400 ver-
sion 1 (reference
ST16SF44ARHQ)
[14]
ST Micro-
electronics,
Bull CP8
ST Micro-
electronics,
Bull CP8
ITSEC FRA 98/01 Apr
1998
E3 High Yes
9 Component ST16601
H/SKG masked for
banking application
B4/B0’ V2 [15]
Groupement
des Cartes
Bancaires
“CB”
ST Micro-
electronics,
Bull CP8,
GIE CB
ITSEC FRA 97/04 Dec
1997
E3 High Yes
Table 1 Survey of Smart Card Certifications.
Making Sense of Smart Card Security Certifications 9
3.1. EXPLANATION OF TABLE HEADINGS
The column, “Resists Attack Potential” in Table 1 requires some ex-
planation. For ITSEC certifications it refers to the claimed minimum
strength of mechanisms (SoM). As was discussed in section 2.1, the SoM
claim implies that the TOE can resist attackers possessing the stated
level of expertise, opportunity and resources. So a TOE claiming a ba-
sic SoM could be compromised by an attacker with a medium level of
expertise, opportunity and resources but a TOE with a high SoM could
resist an attacker with a high level of expertise, opportunity and re-
sources, successful attack being beyond practicality. For the Common
Criteria certifications, the value in this column is determined by the
vulnerability component selected from the AVA VLA assurance family.6
Without augmentation AVA VLA.1 applies to EALs 1-3. AVA VLA.1
does not require the evaluator to conduct an independent search for
vulnerabilities. It merely requires that there are no obvious exploitable
weaknesses. Therefore a TOE certified with vulnerability component
AVA VLA.1 might be compromised by an attacker with a low attack
potential. Table entries 6 and 7 don’t have an entry in this column
because they are EAL3 and EAL1 certifications. They have not been
certified to resist attackers with a low attack potential. Entries 3 and 5
are EAL1 certifications but they have been augmented by the inclusion
of vulnerability component, AVA VLA.2. This vulnerability component
requires an independent search for vulnerabilities that could be exploited
by an attacker with low attack potential. The TOE must resist such at-
tackers.
The column labelled “Limited Scope?” is concerned with whether
there are significant limitations on the scope of the evaluation.7 Some
interesting patterns emerge. All of the surveyed ITSEC certifications
claim a high minimum SoM, implying that successful attacks are not
practical, even for attackers with a high attack potential. All of these
evaluations also have their scope limited in critical ways. Table entries
1 and 2 exclude the integrated circuit from the TOE while entries 8
and 9 limit the evaluation to phases of the card lifecycle up to and in-
cluding integrated circuit testing. Bonding, personalisation and actual
use are excluded. Entry 4 evaluates very specific security functionality
6The three levels of attack potential map to the four components of the vulnerability analysis,
(AVA VLA) assurance family. AVA VLA.4 requires resistance to attackers possessing a high
attack potential. AVA VLA.3 requires resistance to attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential. AVA VLA.2 requires resistance to attackers possessing a low attack potential.
AVA VLA.1 requires resistance to obvious attacks.
7While a yes/no dimension admittedly requires a degree of generalisation and subjectivity,
the column remains informative nonetheless.
10
namely, bus and memory encryption with true random number genera-
tion, monitoring of operational modes, phase management and espionage
protection. This scope limitation raises some interesting issues which are
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.
3.2. MONDEX - E6 HIGH OR EAL1 LOW?
Table entry 2 lists the UK ITSEC certification of the Mondex Purse
on MULTOS Version 3 on the Hitachi H8/3112 chip . This product was
successfully evaluated at E6, SoM High in September 1999. Table entry
3 lists the French Common Criteria evaluation of the Mondex Purse on
MULTOS Version 4.1 on the Infineon SLE66CX160S chip. This product
was certified8 at EAL1 augmented with AVA VLA.2. The difference in
the certification level achieved by the two Mondex products under the
ITSEC and Common Criteria certification schemes is significant to say
the least. The UK ITSEC E6 certification represents the highest level
of assurance and the Highest SoM rating. The French Common Criteria
EAL1 evaluation represents the lowest level of assurance, but more im-
portantly, the vulnerability assessment at AVA VLA.2 means that the
product is only certified to resist attackers possessing a low attack po-
tential. The certifications imply that attacks on the Hitachi H8/3112
based purse are beyond practicality but attacks on the SLE66CX160S
based purse could be achieved by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
How can this considerable disparity be explained? One possibility is
that the SLE66CX160S chip is less secure than the Hitachi H8/3112.
But this seems to be a less than satisfactory explanation given that the
SLE66CX160S chip was certified at E4 SoM High in March 1999,9 and
the Hitachi H8/3112 has not been certified at all. A more plausible
explanation can be found in the certification report for Mondex on the
Hitachi chip which includes the following assumption about the TOE’s
environment:10
“The ICC used for the purse is tamper-resistant and withstands tam-
pering attacks with a strength that is consistent with a High SoM.”
An identical assumption appears in the UK ITSEC MULTOS certifi-
cation [2]. It is quite clear from other sections of the certification reports
that the chip is excluded from the TOE and has not been evaluated un-
der ITSEC. If disparity in the security of the underlying chips cannot
8Only one month later, in November 1999.
9Refer to table entry 4.
10Annex A: Summary of the Security Target - Environmental Assumptions in [2]. Note that
the TOE in table entry 2 is the Mondex application and the TOE in table entry 1 is the
MULTOS operating system.
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explain the differences in certification level11, it raises the following ques-
tion. Would the Mondex purse on the Hitachi chip have reached E6 SoM
High if the chip had been included in the TOE? We are unable to answer
this question but the exclusion of the chip seems somewhat artificial and
conspicuous. It is the only instance that we can locate where a certi-
fication of a smart card loaded with an application excluded the chip.
Table entries 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9 are certifications of smart cards loaded
with banking applications and the TOE includes the integrated circuit,
operating system and application.
The separate evaluations of the MULTOS operating system [2] (where
the chip is excluded) and the Mondex purse [1] (where the chip and op-
erating system are excluded) creates similar uncertainty. The summary
of the Mondex purse security target [1] states that “The TOE is also
protected against specific hardware attacks by the MULTOS software
interacting with the hardware alarm sensors”. But the MULTOS ITSEC
evaluators did not examine this aspect of the card’s operation because
hardware tamper resistance was assumed to justify a high minimum
SoM. The evaluator did not perform independent penetration testing
to verify it. Also, the security functionality claimed in the MULTOS
security target is very specific and focuses on the secure loading and
deletion of applications and insuring that one application cannot access
another application’s memory space. The Mondex E6 evaluation relies
on the synergistic cooperation of hardware alarm sensors and MUL-
TOS software to defeat certain hardware attacks12 but confidence in
this functionality has not been established within the same independent
evaluation framework.
The Common Criteria certifications in table entries 3, 5, and 7 evalu-
ate cards loaded with a financial application.13 These TOEs include the
three layers namely, integrated circuit, operating system and applica-
tion as an integrated whole. Table entries 3 and 5 resist attackers with
a low attack potential while entry 7 does not, (resisting only obvious
attacks). This tends to encourage a speculation that attaining certifi-
cations with resistance to medium and high attack potentials under the
Common Criteria is more difficult than under ITSEC. The lowest ITSEC
SoM in the survey is High and the highest under the Common Criteria
is Low. The Smart Card Security User Group Smart Card Protection
11Another possible explanation is that the TOE could have achieved a higher level of assur-
ance but the sponsor only required evaluation at a lower level.
12Threats of this nature are included in the security target. “Creating value within a purse
using electronic or physical means” and “forging a purse with value on it” are examples [1].
13Table entries 3 and 7 include stored value electronic purse applications.
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Profile (SCSUG-PP)14 emphasises that a vulnerability to certain types
of threats can only be ascertained by examining the integrated circuit,
operating system and application as an integrated whole because effec-
tive security relies on a synergistic contribution of these three layers.
Resistance to differential power analysis and manipulations of the clock
signal and power are examples of threats that must be examined in the
context of the integrated platform.
SCSUG-PP [16] requires an assurance level of EAL4 augmented by
the selection of AVA VLA.3 which demands resistance to attackers pos-
sessing a medium attack potential. AVA VLA.3 mandates that the eval-
uator perform and document a systematic search for vulnerabilities. The
SCSUG-PP reinforces this requirement through a refinement to the vul-
nerability analysis component15 requiring that the analysis take into
account certain guidelines that direct the search for exploitable vulner-
abilities:16
“(Refinement) The analysis shall take into account the following generic
vulnerabilities: a) The TOE may be subject to deconstruction to reveal
internal circuits and structures.
b) The TOE may be subject to tampering with the structure and con-
tent of internal memories, data transport mechanisms, security func-
tions, and test methods.
c) The TOE may be subject to analysis of information which is internal
to the device, through monitoring of connections between elements of
the circuits and structures.
d) The TOE may be subject to use of logical commands to produce
responses that lead to security vulnerabilities.
e) The TOE may be subject to manipulations outside defined opera-
tional boundaries that lead to security vulnerabilities.
f) The TOE may be subject to analysis of information that is available
external to the device through monitoring emanations or any of the con-
nections to the device including power, ground, clock, i/o, and reset.
g) The TOE may be subject to vulnerabilities that have been identified
in preceding generations of the same, or a similar, TOE.”
This guidance is reflected in the specific identification of these issues
as threats and the inclusion of security objectives that address them.
They are also directly reflected in detailed functional and assurance re-
quirements.
Contrast this approach with that of table entry 6, (a Philips Smart
Card Controller used as the IC in the entry 5) whose security target
specifically excludes threats relating to physical tampering. The secu-
rity targets for table entries 8 and 9 naturally focus on threats that are
14Annex D - Packages, Section D.5.1 - Allocation of Threats to Packages, page D-8 of [16].
15Specifically AVA VAL.3.1C - Content and presentation of evidence elements.
16Section 6.6.5, page 98 of [16].
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relevant to the card lifecycle stages of design, manufacture and testing
since the evaluation limits its scope to these phases. These threats in-
clude theft, alteration or substitution of the mask, theft or disclosure
of application software, personalisation of card(s) by an unauthorised
entity, and unauthorised modification of configuration data.17 It seems
reasonable to question whether the High SoM would have been achieved
had threats in the environment of actual use been fully considered in
the security target. As a consequence, the certification does not provide
the card issuer with an authoritative independent assessment of how
the card will counter these threats when in the unsupervised custody of
untrusted users.
This is not to say that card certifications examining the phases of
design, manufacture and testing are not important. This is a critical
part of the card lifecycle where vulnerabilities can be introduced. But
it is also only part of the picture. Similarly with the UK ITSEC cer-
tifications of MULTOS and Mondex, whose focus is on protocol design
and the quality of the software that comprises the operating system and
application. This is also very important since software bugs can be ex-
ploited simply with a card reader and a PC. But the approach of the
SCSUG-PP [16] suggests that still more is needed. Unless a sensible,
realistic and complete set of threats are examined and addressed in the
context of an integrated product in an operational environment, a certi-
fication runs the risk of misleading those who do not carefully study the
scope of the security target.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an analysis of ITSEC and Common Criteria cer-
tifications as they apply to smart cards. This included a survey of ac-
tual smart card certifications relevant to the finance and banking in-
dustry. We highlighted the difficulty in interpreting and determining
minimum strength of mechanism and performing vulnerability analysis
in the context of smart cards, a problem that flows from the orientation
of the two certification schemes toward software and components for
networked computer systems. These are typically expensive, monitored
and afforded external protection whereas smart cards are inexpensive
and issued in large numbers to untrusted users for their long term and
unsupervised retention. This together with the nature of a smart card
as a small portable device without its own power or clock signal, creates
17SCSUG-PP [16] also requires effective protection against these threats.
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a unique set of threats and considerable difficulty in applying SoM and
vulnerability assessment guidance.
We discussed the ITSEC certifications in the survey, noting that they
all claimed a high SoM but the scope of each evaluation was also limited
in some way, either to particular phases of the card lifecycle, by exclusion
of the chip from the TOE or by specifically excluding relevant threats.
We questioned whether a high SoM would be attained if all threats were
considered in the context of the integrated product, as it is issued to
the user in its actual mode of use. We contrasted the Common Criteria
certifications which were evaluated to resist attack potentials rated at
low, (or less). We questioned whether the security target scope restric-
tions contributed to this difference. The analysis served to highlight the
importance of interpreting a certification in the context of the security
target.
As a final note we wish to emphasise that evaluations that are limited
in scope in some way are still useful, but they do require care in their
interpretation. Card issuers will derive the greatest utility from certifi-
cations that are based on a realistic and complete set of threats. The
SCSUG-PP [16] recognises this and presents a thorough and detailed
evaluation baseline. While the design, development and manufacturing
phases are important, and software quality is equally important, address-
ing threats in the context of an integrated product in its environment
of use is the only way to arrive at a balanced assessment of a card’s
security from the issuer’s perspective. After all, one of the key aims
of certification is to provide a basis by which, potential purchasers of a
product can decide whether it is appropriate for their needs.
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